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Even though they possess several power resources, Brazilian 
Presidents also elaborate their legislative proposals based upon 
bills already being processed in Congress through a phenomenon 
called Appropriation of the legislative agenda. In this paper I 
examine the conditions under which this phenomenon occurs by 
means of a typology and a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). 
I conclude that Appropriation provides the President with the 
expansion of the formal support base by controlling the agenda of 
allied and opposition parties as well as obtaining the "paternity" 
of several policies already in motion in Congress, thus enabling a 
public association of the President's actions and his or her party 
with the possibility of social benefits. Be it in the pursuit of 
promising agendas or for the maintenance of their own 
dominance, Appropriation shows that Brazilian Presidents must 
go beyond coalition presidentialism. 
Keywords: Appropriation; coalition presidencialism; 
agenda power; ad hoc coalitions; QCA. 
 
 
he Brazilian experience, consolidated in the legislative predominance of 
the Presidency, often leads to the general idea that the Executive, with 
its broad powers and self-sufficiency in drafting policy propositions, would make 
the Legislative a subservient power or simply a mere ceremonial stage in 
the law-making process. However, a more attentive eye on the legislative work 
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reveals that, even for such a powerful political actor, the mission to govern is 
complex and requires much more than power, but the ability to use them. 
Furthermore, the set of ideas and perceptions of problems and propositions to 
address national challenges does not exclusively pass through decision makers 
operating within the Executive. In addition to the various forms of influence from 
organized interest groups, we also find the active participation of political actors in 
the National Congress. These aspects create a favorable setting for several 
parliamentary propositions to call the attention of the Presidency, which then 
seeks to act on the legislative process in different ways, among which we highlight 
the recently observed phenomenon of Appropriation of the Legislative agenda. 
Appropriation occurs when the Executive builds on ongoing bills in 
Congress, as well as the content of the debates and other byproducts of the 
ongoing legislative process, to prepare and submit its own propositions, 
incorporating additional elements to the legislative agenda, and in some cases 
impeding the development of the agenda being debated in Parliament (ARAÚJO 
and SILVA, 2012; SILVA and ARAÚJO, 2013). Moreover, this phenomenon features 
bills originating from within the Presidential coalition as well as the opposition.  
From the point of view of policy content, the phenomenon shows different 
traits and can reach a point where the President practices Appropriation through 
verbatim copying of bills in Congress. A typical case was the approval of Law nº 
11.520/2007, which granted special pension to people affected by leprosy and 
subjected to isolation and compulsory hospitalization. This law had its origins in 
Provisional Measure (PM) 373/2007, of which its text and explanatory statement 
were almost literally copied from Senate Bill 206/2006, which had already passed 
the Senate and was proceeding through the Chamber of Deputies when the PM was 
published. 
On the other hand, one can also observe that several parliamentary 
initiatives attract the attention of the Executive in a negative sense. Therefore, by 
opposing the idea being discussed, the President performs Appropriation as an 
intervention on that specific agenda, presenting a proposition tailored to their 
preferences. A case that falls within this perspective was PM 232/2004, 
responsible for readjusting the income tax rate. At the time and under the same 
subject, circa 11 bills were in motion in an advanced stage in Congress, whose 
Rafael Silveira e Silva 
 
             97                                                         (2014) 8 (3)                  95 – 135 
propositions greatly diverged from the intentions of the Executive Branch. 
Appropriation was the easiest path for the President, presenting their own 
proposition rather than to work to change bills already under discussion. It should 
be stressed that Appropriation cases are not rare or isolated facts. In a survey 
conducted between 1995 and 2010 (ARAÚJO and SILVA, 2012) it was shown that 
approximately 18% of provisional measures and 40% of the bills had full or partial 
association with Appropriation. 
 




* Six-month moving average of the propositions, excepting the exclusive initiative (art. 61, 
§ 1º, and art. 165 of Constitution). 
 
Therefore, Appropriation is part of the current practices within the 
Brazilian political system, regardless of the political party in power. 
The question that arises is why and under which conditions the head of 
the Executive Power makes use of this strategy, taking into account the system of 
governance and the building of formal majorities known in the Brazilian case, since 
Abranches (1988), as coalition presidentialism1. My argument is that in spite of the 
                                                            
1 Abranches (1988) reflected on the institutional dilemma marked by strong presidents 
and a fragmented party system, influenced by regional and private characteristics and 
lacking an ideological and programmatic identity. However, evidences have demonstrated 
the ability of the President to mobilize majorities via coalitions, ensuring the stability and 
success of mandates and converting coalition presidentialism as being practically 
synonymous with governability in Brazil. Although his researches have collaborated to 
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Executive's success rates, the act of governing is not always in accordance with the 
very strict premises regarding this system. Furthermore, while the Presidency's 
power to legislate does have institutional foundations there are also strategic and 
contingent reasons, which depend on the complexity of the issues at stake and the 
capacity of the head of the Executive Power. 
Under these terms, Appropriation demonstrates President's capacity in 
determining which propositions shall be taken under consideration in Congress 
and at what moment this occurs, thus showing a clear indication of the power of 
the agenda, but in a way hitherto not perceived within the scholarly debates on 
coalition presidentialism. 
Therefore, the existence of the phenomenon gives rise to an investigation 
of an alternative form of association between the power of the agenda from the 
Executive and the formation mechanisms of party majorities, especially when it 
comes to the hegemony of the Executive in passing laws. 
So, in this article, I intend to identify the game of interactions within the 
Appropriation and verify under what circumstances this phenomenon combines 
the power of the head of the Executive's agenda with the management of 
multiparty coalitions. 
To this end I propose an analytical model that establishes dynamic and 
conjectural relations between the phenomenon and some of the explanatory 
factors for coalition presidentialism. To conduct the empirical test I used a 
comparative analysis tool known as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (RAGIN, 
1987; 2000). This methodological choice intended to establish and verify 
associations between occurrences of Appropriation through a configurational view 
of the variables. 
My view is that this article expands the insights established in studies on 
the relationship between the Executive and Legislative, especially on the need to 
better understand the relationship between the power of an agenda and the 
formation of majorities.  There are ample opportunities for the insertion of 
propositions that depend on the nature, origin, and priorities, underlining 
                                                                                                                                                                              
expression would not be able to qualify Brazilian presidentialism as sui generis in 
comparison to other international experiences. The debate implies the existence of 
alternative viewpoints, including one arguing that the Brazilian system resembles 
European parliamentary democracies. 
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elements rarely addressed in explanations pertaining to the power of Executive 
agenda: the content of the bills and the motivations sustaining them. My argument 
is that the Legislative and the Executive act and react in different forms according 
to the agenda in debate, determining the strategic use of Presidency powers. Thus, 
these elements must be confronted with the political party scenario so that we may 
also comprehend the existing connections with some of the premises of coalition 
presidentialism. 
Lastly, this article places the legislative arena once again as being a central 
focus for the actions of parliamentarians, reevaluating the established notion that 
they lack resources to generate their own legislative propositions (COX and 
MORGENSTERN, 2002). With Appropriation a small inversion occurs: Presidents 
also formulate their strategies by considering the actions from Congress and not 
just its reaction. 
 
Majority formation and agenda power 
It is the goal of the head of the Executive Power to maintain their political 
guild in power. In order to make this happen one of the guarantees is the extent of 
governability, sustained mainly under the condition that the governmental agenda 
is approved. The two main factors to explain governability in Brazil are the 
construction and maintenance of a party coalition and the power of the President's 
agenda. And both factors are often associated with coalition presidentialism. 
The Brazilian experience has shown the ineffectiveness of the President 
acting unilaterally, especially during the Sarney (1985-1989) and Collor (1990-
1992) administrations. The excessive use of the power of the agenda proved to be 
insufficient to overcome the problems of lacking a majority in Congress. Agenda 
power is seen as a necessary condition, albeit not sufficient, for governability, since 
it depends on the strength of coalitions. The most common view is that agenda 
power is a facilitator in coordinating an already well-structured political support 
base in Congress. For this reason, the majority of research in the field of legislative 
studies concentrates its efforts in the formation and management of the coalition 
party, reinforced by the system's multiparty characteristic. Hence the various 
explanations as to how the President molds or controls the party base of support, 
which makes for the majority of the research efforts on coalition presidentialism.  
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The explanatory mosaic to cast this system as a success factor first came as 
a counterpoint to the notion that the electoral system arrangement would tend to 
exacerbate the politicians' individualism (AMES, 2003; MAINWARING, 2001). 
Under these terms the response by Figueiredo and Limongi (2000) to this 
challenge signposted that the heterogeneity of preferences in Congress would be 
shaped by centralized decision-making, functioning as a measure of equilibrium to 
the incentives present in the electoral arena. The institutionalization of rules 
within the Legislative Parliament places control and coordination at the hands of 
leaders, which would ensure a high party discipline and, consequently, the 
functioning of coalitions. Under this scenario Brazilian political parties, fragile in 
the electoral arena, occupy a prominent position in the legislative arena. 
However, when considering limitations present in centralization 
mechanisms, Pereira and Mueller (2003) advocate that the existence of rules is 
insufficient to explain the government's influence over the legislative agenda. This 
control would be reinforced when defining distributive policies and offices in 
exchange for support for propositions agreed between party leaders from the 
governing coalition and the President. Amorim Neto (2002) adds that, in order for 
this to be successful, occupation of offices must obey party representation in 
Congress. The greater the proportion between the parties' ministerial portion and 
their parliamentary weight, the more cohesive and consistent will the coalition 
become. Lastly, the budgetary process is also pointed as being relevant within a 
conception that would structure coalition presidentialism. With full control over 
the budgetary process, the Executive allows for a wide adoption of parliamentary 
amendments to use, through leaderships, as a tool to control coalition members 
voting in Congress (PEREIRA and MUELLER, 2002). 
Thus, considering the agenda power, the existence of centralization, the 
distribution of offices, and budgetary control, this would increasingly incentive 
party behavior consistency. These pillars support the most common conception 
attributed to coalition presidentialism. However, some studies have raised a point 
that goes beyond the mere occurrence of these aspects. Pereira, Power and Rennó 
(2005) presented the first analyses on the administration of coalitions over time 
and observed that the formation of a cabinet was insufficient to ensure the 
Presidency's legislative success. They stress that the Presidency maintains the 
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coalition by other mechanisms and by selectively using its powers. By adopting 
this line of thought, Raile, Pereira and Power (2010) tested the association 
between occupation of government positions and budgetary execution. The 
authors conclude that these political-institutional tools are complementary, 
covering different aspects to ensure the cohesion of the coalition. The variety of 
situations which demanded a selective use of the tools available for the President 
showed that oversized coalitions with high ideological heterogeneity, together 
with a heavy concentration of power within parties, represented severe challenges 
for the President.  
In an alternative view Limongi and Figueiredo (2009) once again call 
attention to the power of the President's agenda. They reverse the previous 
explanatory axis, claiming that it is the power of the agenda that ensures unity in 
the coalition. The policy agendas of the Executive and Legislative would be defined 
in a coordinated manner so as to be complementary rather than antagonistic. Thus, 
the agenda approved would not be the Executive's, but a governmental agenda of 
the majority2. The conclusions reached by the authors, however, were based 
within the budgetary sphere, a process that is largely dominated and driven by the 
Executive. 
Therefore, it would still remain important to discover how the fusion of 
agendas within the legislative arena would occur, whose complexity is a 
complicating factor in the relations between the powers. Another issue is to which 
majority the authors were referring to. Even assuming that they mean formal 
coalitions, the authors' idea is based on the absence of conflict or competition 
between parties, including those comprising the governmental basis. Party 
fragmentation in Brazil entails very heterogeneous formation of coalitions and the 
pursuit of electoral projection does not disappear with the participation of the 
party in the coalition. 
All of these researches mentioned above highlight the role of the head of 
the Executive, but the Brazilian scenario indicates that the results achieved will 
                                                            
2Limongi and Figueiredo (2009) show unease with approaches dealing with the 
characterization of Brazilian presidentialism. For the authors the system has 
parliamentary characteristics, that is to say, with the fusion of powers. This architecture 
would generate the routing of propositions in a coordinated manner and thus the fusion of 
agendas would take place. 
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almost always impose on the President the use of ability and exertion in 
conducting these processes. This demonstrates that the Legislative cannot be 
overlooked, including its concrete actions in building its agendas, even if its agency 
occurs under strong institutional restrictions. In order to govern, the Executive 
must act strategically in the placement of its policy agenda.  
This aspect draws attention to the need to look at Brazilian 
presidentialism in a more dynamic and interactive manner, particularly regarding 
the association between the power of the agenda and the characteristics of the 
coalitions in a fragmented partisan environment. Excessively incisive analyses on 
the presuppositions attributed to the Brazilian presidentialism3 hamper the ability 
to explain certain phenomena, as is the case with Appropriation. 
My argument is that partisan and ideological diversity as well as the 
multitude of topics up for debate in Congress do not always make formal 
majorities as malleable as the President's need to govern. Additionally, I 
understand that agenda power may be applied to the articulation of new 
expressions for forming parliamentary majorities, both for the strengthening of 
formal coalitions as well as the construction of majorities, also external to the 
party base of government support. And this is the new way of looking at the power 
of the agenda as indicated by the practice of Appropriation.  
 
Analytical model for Appropriation 
Since Appropriation is part of the set of practices espoused by the 
Executive, I adopt the idea that it is the result of a particular decision making 
process, albeit inserted within the scope of power of the President's agenda. In 
order to comprehend this process I prepared an analytical model that combines 
two research fronts. 
The first refers to the motivations with the presentation of propositions 
resulting from Appropriation and how it articulates itself with the power of the 
Presidency's agenda. Similarly to the claim by Lowi (1972, p. 299) that "policies 
determine politics", I hereby argue that policies determine the type of Appropriation 
                                                            
3Either way, in spite of controversies that still exist, this study intends to question the view 
of a Brazilian Presidentialism coalition that ensures the President's governability, based 
on the existence of an agenda power, the centralization of decisions by party leaders in 
Congress, the distribution of offices, and management of budgetary amendments. 
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based on the principle that the occurrence of the phenomenon presupposes its 
utility to politics. Thus, I propose the creation of categories in order to differentiate 
the phenomenon. 
In the second analytical front I propose attributes or characteristics of 
Appropriation that may provide subsidies to assess the phenomenon as a type of 
power of the Executive's agenda and its relationship with Brazilian 
presidentialism. 
 
Figure 01. Appropriation analytic model 
 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
 
Just like other political phenomena, the analytical model of Appropriation 
was conceived based on the principle known as equifinality (GEORGE and 
BENNETT, 2004), indicating that each type associated with the phenomenon is the 
result of multiple causes. As the argument goes, similar manifestations of 
Appropriation can be produced through different paths or combinations of selected 
attributes. With this model we observe the dynamics of each type of Appropriation 
in light of the precepts of a multi-party coalition system and the work undertaken 
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Appropriation categories 
The first analytical front was prompted by the following question: what 
would spark the President's interest on bills already underway in Congress? This is 
a question that is difficult to be answered solely by considering the existing 
explanations on coalition presidentialism. The fact is that Appropriation carries in 
itself a set of motivations that can be aligned to common objectives.  
The existence of the phenomenon suggests that a relevant option for the 
Executive is to present its own bill. By assuming the authorship of the proposition, 
the President would stand as the legitimate idealizer and conductor of a particular 
agenda. Stemming from the idea that the phenomenon is intrinsic to the sense of 
opportunity generated by the agenda being pushed forward in Congress, I opted 
for the specification of the effects desired by the President when using 
Appropriation, based on a construction of categories to define the phenomenon. 
There are some traditionally established categories for classifying policies, 
among which I highlight Lowi (1972). The argument used by the author states that 
each policy type has groups providing support and rejection, and these debates 
take place in specific arenas, respecting the different expressions of power from a 
government. The categories I hereby propose for this research are grounded on 
different dimensions. I propose that Appropriation should be considered a strategy 
for reframing the political game against allies and opponents in Congress, by means 
of which the President attempts to maximize the attainment of the government's 
objectives while opting for the more useful option. Through this viewpoint, when the 
opportunity to conduct Appropriation presents itself there is a formal and an 
informal perspective to be considered by the Executive so as to submit a policy to 
Congress. The formal one depicts that the government's central goal, by principle, 
is problem solving by which social justice prevails. The informal perspective 
addresses the social impact in approving a policy. These would be secondary 
objectives from a social point of view, but at the same underlying motivators for a 
decision towards Appropriation. These can be synthesized into categories within a 
pragmatic approach aggregated to the repercussions caused by the political cost-
benefit of the proposed measures. 
Therefore, at first I propose to analyze Appropriation by means of a 
classification of the bills submitted to the phenomenon under two mutually 
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excluding categories. On the one hand, the Legislative agenda may be promising to 
the Presidency and other government parties and with positive repercussions. On 
the other hand, the agenda can be threatening to the interests of these political 
agents, which would force the President to submit a proposition that overrides the 
one in Congress. Thus, the proposed bills are classified as positive agenda bills and 
risk control bills.  
Positive agenda bills are those that attract the attention of the President 
since they hold greater potential for being converted into political gains. The 
interests of the Executive are expressed in obtaining credit claiming4, i.e., that the 
policy would allow members of the government to capitalize the attention or 
visibility in the eyes of public opinion. Within this category we find one of the most 
celebrated policies during President Lula's second term: "Minha Casa Minha Vida" 
(My House, My Life) established by PM 459/2009. It addressed several issues 
associated with housing, among them a chapter on the land regularization of urban 
settlements. It was precisely on this issue that the government conducted 
Appropriation, reproducing with minor differences an important section of the 
replacement to Bill 3057/2000. This bill was on the agenda of the Plenary of the 
Chamber of Deputies awaiting to be voted. Another expression of positive agenda 
is the practice of blame-avoiding (WEAVER, 1986), indicating the interest in 
presenting policies that have the condition of nulling other unpopular decisions 
(such as tax increases) or problems that might compromise the government's 
image (such as corruption allegations). One interesting example is PM 169/2004, 
which allowed for financial transactions of the Guarantee Fund for Time of Service 
(FGTS) in case of urgent personal needs deriving from natural disasters. This PM 
was very similar to PL 3762/2000 and was presented at a delicate moment in 
which the media was extensively covering suspected acts of corruption by 
government officials5. 
                                                            
4This expression, created by Mayhew (1974), is commonly attributed to the strategies of 
parliamentarians to improve their reelection conditions. We opted to use it so as to 
indicate the possibility of securing a positive visibility and subsequently the 
implementation of the measure while also adding the notion of position taking, which in 
this research refers to public disclosure of the Executive's actions during the Presidency 
term. 
5This pertains to the case in which the former advisor to the President, Waldomiro Diniz, 
was accused of extortion, passive corruption and mismanagement. 
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A reverse situation is attributed to bills classified as risk control. In these 
cases, in order to ensure the prevalence of its preferences, the Presidency 
intervenes in the Legislative Agenda by presenting its own proposition. This is 
done in cases of threats to the status quo advocated by the government or in cases 
where the Parliament's proposition for change goes against the President's 
intentions. The risk control category may also be characterized by an action 
intended to control populist urges in Congress, especially those dealing with 
sensitive issues for the public administration. These issues are seen by the 
Executive as a sort of "monopoly", given that the administration's perspective 
prevails. The President is the one interested in any negative consequences arising 
from an improper handling of the matter. They are also policies aligned with 
strategies to maintain dominance over some agendas on which successive 
governments go to great lengths to control, despite the great insistence from 
parliamentarians in presenting different alternatives. Within this category, for 
example, we find all the measures that need to be reviewed periodically, causing a 
significant impact the budgets of state governments, such as the definition of the 
minimum wage and Social Security benefits. The Congress periodically presents 
dozens of bills on these topics. Within it also fall policies pertaining to a more 
typical state control, such as regulatory policies, inspection policies, and 
implementation of administrative and penal punishments.  
So that the categories of Appropriation may also encompass the 
Presidency's modulation to the sense of opportunity generated by Congress 
agenda it is necessary to add another dimensional space: the priority level. This is 
an important aspect of the power of the President's agenda, since, by defining the 
speed of the processing rate it attempts to maintain the debate calendar under 
control (DÖRING, 1995). The works in Congress also interfere with the processing 
rate desired by the Executive. By studying the mechanisms of acceleration of the 
presidential agenda, Pereira and Mueller (2000) observed that the prerogative to 
request urgency in discussing propositions can vary according to the differences 
between the interest shown by the committees and the President. The smaller 
these preferences, the smaller would be the need to speed up work. 
At the legislative initiative, the President may submit bills at a normal or 
ordinary pace through constitutional urgent requests or through provisional 
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measures (PM). Although any introduction of a government bill should 
significantly demarcate works in Congress, it is natural that those with a higher 
priority shall occupy most of the legislative debate. As for the PMs, they are the 
most effective form for the Executive to legislate and to quickly convert its 
propositions into laws. Its effects are immediate and the discussion rite in 
Congress has precedence over all others, besides the fact that they are brief. This 
aspect imposes differentiated conditionalities. 
For the Presidency it would be much simpler to send all legislative 
propositions via provisional measures. But the reality is not consistent with this 
practice. That is why some explanations are required to justify the use of different 
legislative instruments in presenting propositions submitted to Appropriation. 
Thus, through the priority level one can observe the selective use of 
presidential prerogatives by means of the speed of the processing rate of its 
propositions. The priorities depend on the interactive game between the Executive 
and the Legislative branches and the level of influence of internal government 
decisions, be it from the Presidency, the cabinet post which proposed the agenda, 
or even from other parties within the coalition. Different priorities also determine 
different treatments between governmental agendas concurrently transiting in 
Congress. Diniz (2005) points to the existence of such behavior as being a 
"hierarchical agenda". The author emphasizes that many of the propositions placed 
forward by the President are merely used as instruments of negotiation or 
accommodation of interests within the coalition. They do not come accompanied 
by the use of resources to expedite processing and are usually left to transact 
according to the timing of the National Congress itself. 
Once established that the level of priority varies according to the 
proposition type, six possible categories of Appropriation arise, as shown in Figure 
2. The lower priority level categories are worthy of a few comments. An 
Appropriation by Positive Agenda with low priority level, classified as Preparatory, 
indicates the government's interest for a legislative action that demarcates its 
presence in the discussions of certain agendas. However, this presence reveals 
itself with a higher level of "patience" in regards to the power of the agenda, due to 
the need the proposition has to acquire greater consensus and maturation after 
being sent to Congress. The lower priority reveals, in such cases, an investment by 
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the Executive with no expectation of such bills being approved. On the other hand, 
it is also a manifestation of a phenomenon that enables the government to gain 
more time to act at the most opportune moment and thus focus in due course in 
approving its agenda. In this situation the Legislative is used as an "incubator" for 
the Presidency's bills, hence the category being named "preparatory". In the same 
line of reasoning, Appropriation by Preliminary Control Risk are those in which the 
government invests just enough effort to ensure that the status quo does not 
change or is modified except under the President's strictly authorized terms. These 
are cases that function merely as a prevention. 
 
Figure 02. Appropriation categories  
 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
 
Appropriation attributes  
In this second research front I outline the modulation attributes or 
parameters from which the categories of Appropriation shall be analyzed. 
The planning of the various governmental legislative agendas performed 
through Appropriation requires different tools than those available for the 
government to achieve governability. Furthermore, to understand what incites the 
President's interest it becomes crucial to evaluate what is relevant from the 
standpoint of this political agent by estimating the confluent points between its 
propositions and those from Congress. The initial theoretical framework shows the 
set of possibilities available to the Executive as well as the challenges it must face 
to approve new policies. By following Beckmann (2010) I argue that Appropriation 
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has the characteristics of an early game strategy6: an anticipatory movement by 
starting a new legislative game, that is to say, by presenting new proposition 
stemming from those already being processed in Congress. Appropriation would 
take place even before the Legislative's final decision and would be boosted by the 
Executive's ability to coordinate or to persuade others of the substantive value of 
the bills involved. 
With this understanding the choice of attributes shall follow the proposed 
model, being divided into two explanatory axes: informational gain and party 
connection. In the first, the attributes will be based on the content of the 
propositions and the set of factors promoted by the legislative process which favor 
the President's interests in Congressional bills. The second axis will lead to the 
choice of attributes dealing with how agents performing Appropriation occupy, 
divide and articulate in power. 
 
Informational Gain 
This perspective relates to the substantive part of the "appropriated" 
agenda, as well as all of the work subsidizing the development of the proposition's 
text. The approach here is bound to the origin and as to how the information 
subsidizing the Executive's alternative strategy is treated.  
Pereira and Mueller (2000), by using the informational perspective 
adopted by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), call attention to the importance of 
evaluating the President's strategic use of the work from the committees in 
Congress, both in terms of factor adhesion among the preferences from the 
Legislative and Government bills, as well as the stage of such discussions in 
Congress. The authors underline that depending on the works performed, the 
committees could serve the interests of the Executive Power. This perspective 
reveals just how important the legislative process can be as a source of 
information for decision making by Appropriation. When such a decision happens 
one deduces that a range of information was analyzed by government agents 
                                                            
6When observing the American case, Beckmann (2010) argues that the Executive is 
strongly constrained in the presentation of legislative propositions, which encourages 
actions from the Presidency during the agenda preparation stage, when leaders are 
mobilized and convinced of the importance of the issues at the same time in which ways to 
nullify or discourage the opposition's propositions are analyzed. In turn, strategies known 
as end games are centered on the ability to amass votes in plenary decisions. 
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(party leaders, parliamentary advisers, coalition members), from the content and 
merit of the proposition produced in Congress up to the conditions and actors 
fostering its presentation. 
On the one hand, the path traveled by bills in Congress and its discussion 
momentum indicate the manner by which parliamentarians and parties have 
handled their agenda, also generating relevant information for decision-making by 
external agents, including the Executive itself. On the other hand, the idea that it 
was "appropriated" is the established link between the preferences of the 
Executive, tied to political beliefs as well as governmental objectives, and the 
parliamentarians' preferences. To analyze the path followed by the bills, I propose 
that one of the attributes necessary to understand Appropriation is the STAGE of 
the legislative process. Depending on the STAGE, the process of Appropriation 
assumes different directions. For each bill that draws the Executive's attention we 
need to know the latest product of legislative works, so that we can assess how 
contributions from Congress were appropriated. The possibilities of the 
government finding something of interest within the Legislative are varied, but 
they are dependent on the "informational load" offered by the processing of bills. 
The more advanced the processing, the larger set of information will be available 
by the process (content of the discussions, amendments, opinions, which political 
actors participated, which parties and interest groups are involved, among others). 
Thereby, STAGE is defined by the phase the bill was found when being handled in 
Congress until being submitted to Appropriation by the Presidency.  
I established four categories for STAGE, described in an increasing scale as 
to their informational load (see Table 01).   
Once identified the STAGE when bills in Congress were "appropriated" it 
still becomes necessary to verify its level of alignment or distancing among the 
preferences presented by the Executive's proposition. This information is collected 
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Table 01. Categories for the STAGE attribute  
Stage Detailing 
FROZEN 
When the issue was not discussed, there was no joint processing 




When joint processing occurs in a time period under one year, but 
with no debates in the committees and presentation of reports.  
PROGRESSIVE 
When there are discussions, reports and hearings. The discussion of 
the opinion report must not exceed one year, otherwise the STAGE 
may be considered to be "frozen". 
VETO 
The decision towards Appropriation begins with the President's veto. 
Through the vetoed project it becomes possible to extract high 
amount of information, more than in all other stages, considering the 
concluded discussions on both Houses of Congress. 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
 
The closer the Executive's preferences are from the parliamentarian's bills 
the more Appropriation will be characterized as a strategy aimed at persuading 
Congress, even if the bill's origin came from an opposition party. In fact, in such 
cases it becomes quite evident that by taking an interest and investing on a 
legislative agenda led by the opposition, the greater are the President's chances to 
overthrow the oppositional urges of these parties when deliberating the 
governmental proposition. 
To measure PREFERENCE I created an index consisting of criteria for 
determining the distance between preferences at different levels. The guideline for 
each criterion was achieved by comparing the content of texts, collating the 
proposed government bill with propositions submitted to Appropriation (see Table 
02). 
The index value, identified by the sum of scores will be the value of the 
attribute PREFERENCE. This result reveals both an overall approximation between 
policies (index "0") and a complete distance in preferences (value "3"), with the 
variety of combinations between these two extremes depending on the scores 
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Table 02. Calculation of the preference attribute 




Objectives in the 
Executive's proposal 
Target audience for the 
Executive's proposal 
Organization, concepts, 
and instruments of 
policy in the 
Executive's proposal 
0,0 Similar Same 
Predominance of the 





a small variation 
Shares the same 
audience, admitting a 
small variation 
Noticeable differences, 
but which do not 
undermine the 
similarities  
1,0 Scant similarity 
Much larger or much 
more restricted  
Few aspects in common 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
 
Party connection 
When looking at the international experience there are some consensuses 
regarding party behavior and their stance on government support. The 
characteristics of the American system, for example, indicate that legislative 
prevalence in Congress and the control of its institutions are crucial to 
governability. This requires for the President to dialogue, negotiate, and bargain 
with the party dominating the main positions in Congress (CAMERON, 2000; COX 
and McCUBBINS, 2005). 
The dynamics becomes more complex in European countries, where the 
presence of multiple parties in the coalition supporting the government demand a 
strong governance scheme by which the partners must be able to overcome the 
tension generated between the collective interest (the government's), in a mutual 
accommodation, and the individual incentives (the parties) pursued by each by 
means of their policies (MARTIN and VANBERG, 2011). Under these parliamentary 
democracies prevails a sense of establishing compromises on policies and, at the 
same time, the delegation to prepare legislative propositions to ministers, that is, 
to a specific party. However, partisan influence cannot be verified solely on one 
specific jurisdiction. Legislative institutions also allow for the improvement of 
policies under a type of mutual intra-coalition control. 
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In light of these arguments how would Brazilian parties behave? In a 
Brazilian coalition government with a strong President it is relevant not only to 
know which parties compose the support base, but also to know the dynamics 
between them within the government. The possibilities most frequently cited to 
reduce potential tensions among government members are the distribution of 
offices and the distribution of resources by budgetary amendments. However, the 
foundations for understanding party policymaking still lack depth. From the 
viewpoint of studies on coalitions, the strong interest in verifying which parties 
participate in the government coalition is usually founded on the belief that merely 
knowing who is in government is enough to infer what type of policies will be 
presented. However, for the Brazilian scenario this path still merits further 
analysis. The parties do not make clear the nature of the policies advocated by 
them and the context of a coalition government makes this comprehension much 
more nebulous. 
I understand that the study of Appropriation helps to clarify this question 
as it favors the analysis of the relationship between parties occupying ministerial 
offices and parties in which parliamentarians associate themselves to 
"appropriate" draft bills. Depending on the partisan association between political 
agents practicing Appropriation and those linked to the "appropriate" bill, it 
becomes possible to infer these policies capacity to interfere and to shape policies. 
I named this explanatory axis party connection. 
Through party connection I intend to analyze the relationship between 
parties holding positions in government and the stance taken against opposition 
parties. It is interesting to note that this aspect takes us to the work of Cox and 
McCubbins (2005), through which they define that a successful party behavior is 
concentrated in controlling the legislative agenda through which they termed 
"legislative cartel". Party leaders would favor bills from members of their same 
party and, in the opposite direction, would seek to impose a veto on propositions 
coming from opposition parties. For the first scenario leaderships would use their 
"positive" agenda power, by which we observe the ability to direct draft laws 
towards approval. As for the oppositions, the cartel would use its "negative" 
agenda power by not allowing bills to move forward within the legislative process. 
Furthermore, Cox and McCubbins (2005) emphasize that in seeking control of the 
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agenda, the parties seek to anticipate preferences, also conducting a "negative 
control" over its members. By clearly establishing the boundaries of what is 
amenable to be accommodated, propositions coming from outside the party would 
be blocked, thus reducing the pressure on how their members vote. The major 
difference between the reality interpreted by the authors and the Brazilian reality 
is that the main driving force of a "cartelized" behavior lies in the participation of 
the Executive (AMORIM NETO, COX and McCUBBINS, 2003). 
Furthermore, if in the Brazilian reality there is no prior party control over 
what their parliamentarians in Congress presents there may be a subsequent 
selection process by which propositions may count with the support of party 
leaders and receive special referral. I understand that this is where Cox and 
McCubbins provide an important association with Appropriation. Even though 
Brazilian parties lack enough programmatic identity to influence bills placed 
forward by its members, the possibility of Appropriation may encourage parties to 
exercise the role of filters and selectors, especially by means of a governmental 
coordination. This would provide a well paved path for bills with a consistent 
content insofar that they are resubmitted by the President. Beyond the use of 
parties to verify promising bills so as to conduct Appropriation, the Presidency may 
also use this same procedure for propositions submitted by other parties (INÁCIO, 
2009). Thus, the phenomenon may serve to displace opposition visibility in 
obtaining political benefits from the authorship of good policies. 
At the same time, Appropriation would also play the role of a control 
mechanism by pointing possible dangers and dissensions that could impose harm 
on governmental interests. Similarly to the legislative cartel theory, the Executive 
may hold negative agenda control, thus blocking propositions from 
parliamentarians within the coalition base as well as from the opposition. 
Nevertheless, the hue brought by Appropriation is that negative agenda power 
occurs indirectly, by presenting competing propositions and not solely through 
other mechanisms such as veto. 
Given these characteristics to obtain attributes to the phenomenon, the 
party connection can be disaggregated to detect the President's action in relation to 
other parties so as to know if it was a shared strategy within the coalition or if 
there was some level of concentration in the decision making process. Within this 
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explanatory axis the first attribute of the phenomenon concerns the party ties to 
the one occupying the head of the Executive Branch, indicating the Presidency's 
influence power and how representative its party is within the Appropriation 
process. I have named this attribute PRESIDENT'S MINISTER. It will assume the 
characteristic of a dummy variable that registers whether the Executive's 
proposition to configure Appropriation was signed by a minister of the same party 
as the one in Presidency (value"1"), or if it was introduced from the initiative of 
ministers from other parties (value "0").  
The other attribute reflects the counterpart relation to the phenomenon, 
that is, with the author or rapporteur of the bill in the Congress' agenda, which was 
subsequently submitted to Appropriation. This attribute, called CONVERGENCE, 
was drawn from parameters aimed at locating the parties of the authors or 
rapporteurs in relation to the President's party, much like a pattern of partisan 
adhesion. 
Taking as reference the party of the author or rapporteur for the 
"appropriated" proposition, the CONVERGENCE level stems from the composition 
of three evaluation filters7, as shown in Table 03. 
 
  Table 03. Elaboration of codes applicable to party convergence 
 
 
Situation of the 

















Conditions (scores) Yes = 1                          No = 0  
Possibilities 
(∑ scores) 
1 1 1 3 
1 1 0 2 
1 0 1 2 
1 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
 Source: Prepared by the author. 
                                                            
7In this case it is important to rely on the stage of the legislative process so that we may 
identify which party conducted the bill's handling and processing. In case of a frozen stage, 
the party considered was the same as the bill's writer. As for the "awaiting discussion" 
stage, if there was no writer we then evaluated whether party predominance was found. If 
that was not the case then we considered it to be zero convergence. 
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The first three situations appear to be similar. It so happens that the 
coalition is multi-partisan and heterogeneous, and therefore a closer inspection is 
required. The argument for this attribute is that there could be a greater 
integration between parliamentarians and the government through their party 
affinities, implying that the greater the convergence, the greater the scope for 
negotiation and coordination, thus benefiting both sides. In contrast, the lower the 
CONVERGENCE, more the Appropriation would be a strategy for cancelling or 
blocking parliamentary initiatives. 
 
Figure 03. Expanded appropriation analytical model  
 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
 
The analytical model allows us to explain Appropriation by different 
combinations of attributes, grouping them into similar categories. It means that 
this type of construction admits that there is no ideal format for this type of 
phenomenon, which is consistent with its complexity. From this argument the 
question that needs to be answered is: what method should be used to verify the 
association between the Appropriation categories and its attributes? 
 
Comparative analysis 
The elaboration of the categories and the selection of the attributes 
revealed typical characteristics of set-theoretic methods since the data represent 
theoretical concepts and the connections with the analyzed phenomenon are 
associative, and which validity and sufficiency demand a simultaneous evaluation 
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of more than one attribute. The very recognition of equifinality as an analytical 
perspective for Appropriation is a consequence of the relationship with set-
theoretic methods. 
The method choice was Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), initially 
developed by Ragin (1987). QCA allows for the researcher to study cases from a 
configurational notion so as to understand the phenomenon stemming from the 
idea of "multiple conjectural causation" (RIHOUX and RAGIN, 2009). This concept 
is associated with phenomena that are highly dependent on simultaneous actions 
from multiple causes and with causal heterogeneity. This configurational notion 
fits in very well with the argument by Fiss (2011) that classification systems tend 
to be based on a "logical consistency", that is, in the adjustment between the 
different parts that make up the configuration with the proposed category. 
With this method it is possible to verify that Appropriation is not 
supported by a single attribute, but based on relationships and complementarities 
among the selected attributes. Furthermore, the method allows for a simultaneous 
analysis of multiple cases, an unusual trait in traditional case studies. To 
accomplish this goal, QCA offers operations based on Boolean algebra, whose 
algorithms allow for the identification of regularities within subsets of the 
considered conditions. In this research we applied a fuzzy-set type QCA, since this 
method indicates that relevant objects can have participation variations within a 
given set of solutions (RAGIN, 2000)8. 
A critical aspect of configurational analysis is determining the attributes 
that matter most within the explanatory structure for each Appropriation category. 
Accordingly, I have adopted Fiss' definition of "centrality" (2011), which 
underlines the causal relationships between attributes and the types of 
Appropriation offering the highest theoretical potential. The author suggests that 
core attributes are those indicating a strong causal relation with the result and 
through which the grouping of solutions occurs. In contrast, peripheral attributes 
present a relatively weak causal relationship. 
                                                            
8For more details pertaining to the QCA operation see the Methodological Note. 
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To simplify the understanding of the results generated by the QCA 
minimization algorithms I adopted the graphical notation by Ragin and Fiss (2008) 
and Fiss (2011) within the following terms and interpretations: 
 
Table 04. Notation of the configurations 
Symbol 
Role in the 
Configuration   
Analytical interpretation of the attributes  
● Core  Close PREFERENCE 
 Advanced STAGE of the legislative process 
 Acting MINISTER from the PRESIDENT'S party 
 high party CONVERGENCE • Peripheral 
⊗ Core  distant PREFERENCE 
 little advanced STAGE of the legislative process 
 Acting MINISTER from a different party than the 
coalition 





Any of the interpretations outlined above can be 
suitable, although they do not contribute to define a 
causal relationship with the type of Appropriation 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
 
Results and discussion 
Using the selection procedures9, between 1995 and 2010, 209 bills were 
found where the Presidency had its elaboration done wholly or partially through 
Appropriation. This sample does not indicate a typical small-n research, but the 
methodological strategy allowed for a comparison of the cases found. 
Configurational analyses were carried out for each Appropriation category. 
 
Appropriations by positive agenda 
These Appropriations, whereby the Executive pursues greater visibility in 
the objectives undertaken to generate policies and laws are the most frequent, 
collecting almost 67% of cases. 
 
                                                            
9For more details on the case selection process, see the Methodological Note. 
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Immediate  Urgent  Preparatory 
1 2  3a 3b 3c  4a 4b 5 6 
Informational Gain            
PREFERENCE ● ●  ● ● ●  ● ● ●  
STAGE  ●  ●  ●   ⊗ ● ● 
            
Party Connection            
PRESIDENT’S MINISTER ● ●  ● ●   ●   ● 
CONVERGENCE ●    ⊗ ⊗   ● ⊗ ⊗ 
            
Consistency 0,81 0,77  0,82 0,81 0,84  0,88 0,91 0,90 0,85 
Raw coverage 0,42 0,55  0,41 0,48 0,41  0,68 0,23 0,42 0,35 
Unique coverage 0,08 0,22  0,10 0,17 0,11  0,25 0,02 0,08 0,03 
            
Overall solution 
consistency 
0,77  0,83  0,88 
Overall solution 
coverage 
0,64  0,68  0,81 
Number of cases (%) 28 (13%)  43 (21%)  68 (33%) 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
 
Observing the overall picture for Appropriations by Positive Agenda as to 
their informational gain, the results indicate that the attribute with larger causality 
is proximity among the preferences of the propositions involved in the 
phenomenon. This truly indicated that the positive interest shown by the 
Executive for a particular policy was attuned with propositions already being 
processed in Congress. The strong presence of the advanced STAGE attribute as an 
explanatory factor for the configuration indicates that Legislative works were 
widely used in decisions pertaining to this type of Appropriation. 
Regarding the party connection perspective, the results show the 
centralization of powers in the hands of the President's party and its 
preponderance was more noticeable the higher the agenda's priority. Under a 
descriptive analysis of the data we find that 79% of these Appropriations were 
managed by the President's party. We add to this data the perception offered by 
the configuration that participation from other coalition parties as agents for 
Appropriations by Positive Agenda showed no consistency as an attribute of causal 
relationship. 
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Another aspect to draw our attention is the existence of several 
configurations indicative of Appropriation intended to form "ad hoc coalitions", i.e., 
used as an strategy to encourage the Executive's adhesion to the proposition, 
regardless of the political party. Apart from a formally constituted majority, similar 
preferences between the Executive and Legislative may aggregate votes beyond 
the formal support base. As for the opposition adhesion is enforced since it 
becomes coerced to not vote against bills with which it shares preferences with the 
Presidency. To illustrate, 50% of cases of Appropriations by Positive Agenda have 
their origins in propositions presented or drafted by the opposition. In another 
vein, we should stress the lack of evidence pointing towards strategies from the 
Executive with a cooperative profile with respect to coalition parliamentarians, 
especially with those not directly belonging to the President's party. 
It is worth noting that the presence or absence of some attributes 
pervaded all categories, indicating its modulation in relation to the primacy of 
agendas. Furthermore, the priority level discerning Appropriation types also 
indicated the focusing of strategies: the higher a category priority the smaller the 
number of configurations observed. 
An additional analysis of the solutions generated by QCA points to the 
possibility of aggregating them based on typical strategies adopted when 
conducting Appropriation. 
Solutions "1" and "4b" stand out for underlining Appropriation in 
consortiums with a cooperative regime. They have in common a high PREFERENCE 
attribute in conjunction with high party CONVERGENCE, meaning that the 
Executive conducted Appropriation by means of cooperation with the support 
base, especially among the strongest parties within the coalition. Cooperation may 
occur either by Congress' follow-up work conducted by the ministries' assistants 
or through situations where parliamentarians informally submit their bills to the 
Executive. This cooperation, however, occurs in two very different scenarios. In 
solution "1" this aspect is reinforced by the presence of the PRESIDENT'S 
MINISTER, revealing that in Positive Agenda Appropriations conducted via 
provisional measures we find centralized decision-making, regardless of the work 
already carried out in Congress. In solution "4b" some aspects justify that this 
Appropriation is of low priority. At first it becomes clear that a little advanced 
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STAGE is a strong indicator that negotiations took place outside Congress, and 
which facilitated the positive interest of the government for the bill. Furthermore, 
there was ambiguity regarding the attribute PRESIDENT'S MINISTER. This is a 
typical case of Appropriation as an accommodation of interests within the coalition. 
However, as there is no clear emphasis for approval, this cooperation strategy 
associates itself with the priority level much like a "disguised agenda". 
Alternatively, the strategy inferred in solutions "3b" and "6", marked by 
the presence of the PRESIDENT'S MINISTER and low party CONVERGENCE shows 
the Appropriation as a type of blockade to the opposition's legislative actions. In 
solution "3b" the blockade is explained by the fact that besides direct interference 
from the President's party, the positive interest was roused regardless of the 
STAGE where the opposition's bill was found. In turn, in solution 6, the distance 
shown in the PREFERENCE attribute and the origin of the agenda mobilized the 
President's party in order to advance the STAGE of the legislative process. 
However, in this case, the blockade also assumes the nature of a "disguised 
agenda" since its purpose is to limit the opposition's scope of action and does not 
necessarily indicate a firm intention of converting the bill into law. This is why 
solution 6 is within the category Appropriation by Preparatory Positive Agenda. 
With solutions "2" and "3a" we find examples of Appropriations with the 
formation of ad hoc coalitions. Both maintain a high PREFERENCE and the 
protagonism of the President's party occupying the government. Furthermore, it 
can be stressed that the process took into account the work performed within the 
legislative process. The more advanced STAGE attribute of legislative works 
produced propositions which positively caught the attention of the Presidency 
regardless of whether the origin of the bills was from the opposition or the 
situation. The only difference among the solutions is that in solution "3a" the 
causality relationship is less relevant for the STAGE attribute.  
The formation of ad hoc coalitions is also quite clear in solutions "3c" and 
"5". However, what these configurations have in common is the use of this strategy 
to reach the opposition in particular, i.e., the presence of low party CONVERGENCE. 
Since the Appropriation was based on a proposition originating within the 
opposition, the strategy was originally designed in order to induce adhesion in 
favor of the Executive's proposition. This led to a blockage of the opposition's 
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actions at the same time in which it strengthened the coalition in favor of the 
President's initiative. I stress here that solution "5" indicates that the formation of 
an ad hoc coalition is also applicable to low priority bills, making it clear that the 
government's main interest is the demarcation of its territory within the agenda 
under discussion in Congress without the need to employ its political strength in 
the process. The advanced STAGE offered a wide array of information, albeit not 
sufficient to elevate the level of interest in relation to the set of agendas. 
Information guide decisions, but alone and in itself does not determine the 
government’s priorities. 
Lastly, out of all configurations, solution "4a" showed the wider range of 
possibilities and it could be inserted in any of the previously described strategies. 
The solution reveals that the proximity between preferences and the President's 
party centralizing action are not sufficient factors to determine the priority of the 
agenda. The lack of consensus within the government or simply the cost-benefit 
ratios of other political agendas of the Executive also determine the hierarchy of 
propositions.  
After the configurational analysis I verify that the perspective of the 
phenomenon of Appropriation points to an alternative use of the agenda power 
that does not present as much adhesion to formal coalitions, which ground many of 
the arguments on coalition Presidentialism. For this to be accomplished there 
should be a higher frequency of cooperation strategies between the base of the 
government and the Presidency in Appropriations by Positive Agenda, which would 
indicate stronger alliances and harmony of interests between the executive and its 
support base in Congress. 
The majority of processes were strongly concentrated within the 
President's party. The participation of other parties occurred sparsely, mainly in 
the condition of "targets" for the Appropriation process. When another party 
occupying the head of ministerial offices conducted Appropriation, in most cases 
the phenomenon was relegated to an inferior hierarchy among other government 
agendas, either in preparatory agendas or in simple accommodation of interests.   
What caught my attention the most were the strategies for forming ad hoc 
coalitions. Its use was fairly common in all types of Appropriation by Positive 
Agenda, with a relevant participation of cases directed towards opposition bills. 
Rafael Silveira e Silva 
 
             123                                                         (2014) 8 (3)                  95 – 135 
This panorama reveals that within these Appropriation actions there is a great 
concern from the Presidency in obtaining the "paternity" or authorship of policies 
that are of its interest in Congress, a tenuous cooperation with the support base 
and a major dispute with the opposition. Thus, in seeking to enhance governability, 
the Presidency seeks to expand its array of agendas in Congress, using in a more or 
less cooperative manner its own support base, but also increasing its chances 
through alternatives initially placed forward by the opposition.  
 
Appropriations by risk control 
Appropriations classified within this category demand systematic 
monitoring from the government on policy areas that the Presidency considers 
being its sole responsibility. Being rigidly demarcated, when increased the 
frequency of bills developed in Congress in these areas, that is, the more pressure 
there is within the Legislative for change in the status quo the greater the risk and 
the burden of Executive intervention in the debate. 
As for the results, firstly it is worth mentioning that cases of Appropriation 
by Urgent and Preliminary Risk Control failed to produce consistent configurations, 
making it impossible to find relevant theoretical associations. In the opposite 
direction, Appropriations by Immediate Risk Control display a different scenario. 
Although presenting only one configuration, coverage and consistency indexes 
remained above recommended levels. The result confirms that not only the nature 
of policies, but also the major difference between the preferences of the Presidency 
and Congress were crucial for characterizing this type of Appropriation. 
The presence of PRESIDENT'S MINISTER shows that there exists party 
centralization upon presentation of provisional measures. Since the set of risk 
control policies are restricted to a few areas there is a natural path for there to be a 
concentration of decision-making in the hands of the Executive, since they are 
topics with major impacts on society and on governmental management, and for 





Beyond Brazilian Coalition Presidentialism: 
The Appropriation of the Legislative Agenda 
             124                                                         (2014) 8 (3)                  95 – 135 
Chart 02. Resultant configurations from Risk Control Appropriations 
  Solution  (configuration)  
 Risk Control Appropriation  Immediate  
 Informational Gain    
 PREFERENCE  ⊗  
 STAGE    
 Party Connection    
 PRESIDENT'S MINISTER  ●  
 CONVERGENCE    
 Consistency  0,89  
 Raw coverage  0,81  
 Unique coverage  0,81  
 Overall solution 
consistency 
 0,89  
 Overall solution coverage  0,81  
 Number of cases (%)  34 (16%)  
Source: Prepared by the author.  
 
The configuration also indicates a variation of possibilities. The lack of the 
attributes STAGE and CONVERGENCE in the solution, contrary to what could be 
initially inferred, reveals that Appropriations by Immediate Risk Control are 
conducted regardless of the progress in discussions in Congress or the origin of the 
agenda (coalition or opposition). This goes to show that the severity of the risk to 
the Presidency's interests imposed by the Congressional agenda is what 
determines the Executive's actions. In this direction, the Presidency's need to 
intervene over the parliamentarian's initiatives from its own support base comes 
from the fact that there is no control over the bills presented. Under the most 
diverse topics congressmen in the coalition behave similar to the opposition, 
acting upon whichever their particular interests take them and at the expense of 
guidelines that should originate from the leaderships. This behavior, much like the 
opposition, may cause repercussions throughout Congress, calling for a more 
active tactic from the Presidency, not only in order to block such propositions but 
also to present something to replace them. 
 
Rafael Silveira e Silva 
 
             125                                                         (2014) 8 (3)                  95 – 135 
Conclusions 
Within the Brazilian scenario the Executive's success in approving its 
legislative agenda is clear. However, this result gives to a misleading idea 
regarding the President's ease in making laws and that merely by holding powers 
and a formal majority would be sufficient to achieve the desired results. Instead, 
the multi-partisan reality and the variety of topics addressed within the Congress 
impose challenges that constantly demand for a strategic use of institutional tools 
by the Presidency. Our argument is that merely holding these tolls is insufficient; 
one must know how to use them.  
In this article we advanced the examination of one such strategy: 
Appropriation of the Legislative Agenda, by which the head of the Executive branch 
elaborates and presents bills based on propositions already in progress in 
Congress. This phenomenon reveals an interesting manifestation of the actions of 
the President insofar as the agenda's content entails how to articulate the 
President's own agenda power with the creation of majorities in Congress. 
Therefore, we observed that the association that Appropriation makes 
between the agenda power and the management of multi-party coalition is not 
solely founded on the principles of coalition presidentalism, even though the 
Executive does not neglect such principles for achieving its intended goals. In fact, 
the phenomenon is a creative expression of the agenda power of the President. 
Appropriation indicates that it is possible to use it in a more independent manner, 
expanding the ability to achieve majorities without rupturing the formal coalition 
fabric. This was well documented in the indicative cases of strategies related to the 
formation of ad hoc coalitions. They are interesting insofar as they ensure votes in 
the opposition to compensate for any lack of support within the coalition and 
assist in understanding the conditions that would justify the efforts to merge the 
agendas of the Legislative and the Executive. 
However, this effect has important variations, which also go beyond the 
notion of a harmonious coordination between powers. The fusion of agendas and 
formation of alternative majorities are accompanied by a personalization of the 
propositions. Therefore, as for the creation and presentation of policies, the data 
and analyses show the possibility that the power of the Presidential agenda may be 
exercised by having the President's party as the major beneficiary at the expense 
Beyond Brazilian Coalition Presidentialism: 
The Appropriation of the Legislative Agenda 
             126                                                         (2014) 8 (3)                  95 – 135 
of other parties from the coalition or from the opposition. In order to reach this 
result through a broad set of institutional tools, the President can avoid problems 
with the formal coalition, even when the ratio of Appropriation occurs over risk 
control policies. On the other hand, the President also dribbles opposition parties 
by taking an interesting agenda from them that could provide the Executive with 
greater visibility among the electorate. Thus, in addition to increasing the odds of 
building majorities in Congress and to amalgamate the agendas between the 
powers, the Presidency and its party also gain the "authorship" of many policies 
being discussed in parliament. More than any political actor, the President can 
capitalize on the public disclosure of their actions and correlate them with social 
benefits. 
Lastly, an analysis of Appropriation once again places the legislative arena 
as a potential source for policies, in spite of the inefficiency of the institutions in 
Congress to carry out the parliamentarians' propositions. As it can be seen such 
aspect is effectively explored by the Head of the Executive. 
It continues to be very important to understand the relations between the 
Executive and the Legislative in multi-party environments, stressing the strategic 
use and the complementarity of the tools available for the Executive in forming 
majorities. In countries where the party system is sprayed into several 
associations without programmatic identity, the maintenance of a formal coalition 
is a process whose complexity imposes high political costs on the person 
occupying the Presidency. Within this scenario, strategies such as Appropriation 
compensate the dependence of governing by coalition without compromising 
formal agreements. Whether in search of promising agendas or maintaining their 
own dominance, the head of the Brazilian Executive must go beyond coalition 
presidentialism. 
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Methodological note 
 
Selection and sampling protocols 
We selected the period encompassed by the presidencies of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to conduct the research. This 
option emerged, firstly, since we considered it to be important to incorporate 
different presidential administrations to observe if the existence of the 
phenomenon was associated with the type of presidential leadership or even with 
the nature of the formed coalition. Secondly, because they were the last two 
governments to have faced oversized coalitions, an aspect that is challenging both 
in terms of managing propositions originating from the support base as well as 
controlling propositions from the opposition. Therefore, the paper considers the 
period prescribed starting from 1995 until the end of 2010. 
Once the survey period was selected, further cuts were still necessary for 
the start of the selection process. The most convenient strategy for tracing links 
among the propositions from parliamentarians and the government, in order to 
verify the presence of Appropriation, was to carry out a reverse analysis, by which 
we first selected bills coming from the Executive branch and then investigated the 
possible connections with propositions being processed in Congress. It was then 
established that each legislative proposition originating from an Appropriation 
process would be a unit of analysis in our research. The goal was to achieve a set of 
representative information regarding part of Presidential initiatives, but one which 
could encompass all Appropriation cases within the period. 
It would not make sense to speak of Appropriation of propositions where 
its contents are solely from the President's initiative. Constitutional prerogatives, 
which determine the cases of Presidential private initiative in the submission of 
legislative propositions are clear (Federal Constitution, art. 61, § 1). Even if we 
take into consideration that these prerogatives open broad possibilities for a rich 
legislative production, there would still remain a large list of issues that could be 
handled concurrently by the Legislative and the Executive, and therefore subject to 
Appropriation. 
By researching the websites for the Presidency of the Republic, the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate, a survey was conducted concerning 
all of the bills initiated by the Presidency, as well as any provisional measures from 
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1995 until 2010. Each one was evaluated in the light of the constitutional criterion 
for determining the Presidency's private initiative. We then started the selection 
phase for the President's propositions that had ties with bills in Congress. From 
this analysis it was possible to observe the Appropriation's connections. 
The procedure begins by taking each bill originating from the government 
and, by means of keywords from the text's summary and indexing we carry out a 
search using the available tools in the website of the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Federal Senate for bills being processed at the time. In this case, we recommended a 
prior reading of the proposition's summary and text, and, if necessary, the 
justifications presented by Presidency, since these texts provide information that 
helps to identify the main issues addressed in each proposition. 
Another important factor for this selection is the deadline for the 
incorporation of parliamentary bills for a possible comparison with the 
Presidential proposition in focus. We therefore established a standard selection 
where a parliamentarian bill could be traced until the date immediately preceding 
the submission of the Presidency's proposition. Through this we avoid the mistake 
of taking into account propositions where the President had no basis for 
conducting Appropriation. It is worth mentioning that we did not include an 
analysis of bills already archived/concluded at the time of submission of the 
government's proposition. Although the researcher was aware that the circulation 
of ideas is part of the maturation process of the propositions in Congress, it was 
assessed that the empirical verification of Appropriation should privilege active 
propositions pending within the Legislative. 
Lastly, after all of the observed details above for the selection of cases, the 
most relevant aspect identifying the occurrence of Appropriation is to check 
whether the analyzed texts share the same policy's object. This is the political 
subfield handled by the proposition, the focus in change or legislative innovation 
desired by the political actor; a specific agenda. Obviously, the object of the 
proposition is not "health", "education", "taxation", among others, but a 
propositional action concerning a specific issues wrapped in a wider theme. 
Thus, the ultimate and fundamental filter for the detection of the 
phenomenon is the comparison and conclusion that both propositions, from the 
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executive and the parliamentarian, refer to the same policy object or specific political 
agenda. 
Through a comparison exercise it is important to note that we are not 
merely reducing the analysis to a semantic similarity since this research does not 
deal with the similarity between texts, but something broader. The semantic 
similarity does not consider, for example, contextual factors, referring to attributes 
that are syntactically identical in both situations. In this sense, the comparison 
between the objects sought to observe the political structure of the propositions by 
verifying if they have a certain isomorphism, based on the consistency of the 
binding principles and arguments such as the sharing the same goals, if there were 
similarities or differences in the public target, or if the propositions shared the 
same legal or technical definitions as well as institutional and organizational tools 
eventually needed to implement the desired changes. Thus, what makes a case 
similar or otherwise is the similarity of these characteristics or attributes that truly 
represent the content and context of the occurrence in question. 
 
Application of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) 
QCA is suitable for the multidimensional aspect embedded in the 
elaboration of different types of Appropriation insofar that it deals with the 
existence of different configurations, endorsing the complementarity relations 
among the attributes chosen for this analysis. 
The QCA technique applied in this research was the fuzzy-set technique, 
which reinforces the notion of relevance variance in the attributes for each 
solution or configuration generated (RAGIN, 2000). It should be noted that fuzzy-
set is essentially an interpretive tool, used to operationalize concepts to allow for a 
dialogue between theory and evidence. In practice, instead of working with 
existing binary variables in set-theoric approaches, fuzzy sets allow for the 
insertion of associative values between "0" and "1", providing conditions to clearly 
distinguish objects that can be considered more or less inserted in a given 
category. I emphasize that the entire operation relating to QCA was performed 
with the aid of the software fs/QCA version 2.5 (RAGIN et al., 2006). 
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Data preparation 
In order to define and separate the fuzzy-sets, the QCA requires data 
preparation in a process called "calibration" (RAGIN, 2008a, 2008b). The 
procedure is performed through "qualitative anchors" by means of which we can 
define the attribute level for each case of Appropriation. It is through calibration 
that one obtains the transformation of variables from the database into fuzzy tipe 
variables.  
 
Figure 04. Fuzzy-set calibration of causal conditions and outcome 
 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
 
In Figure 4 we can observe the codes for the attributes and the crossover 
point chosen for each one of these attributes. In the case of variables already 
showing dichotomous characteristics, the crossover point will present the value of 
"0.5", which is the midpoint between the two extremes. The PREFERENCE 
attribute showed the highest variation level. When the approximation of 
preferences indicates a departure of 50% in relation to the original text, it is 
located at a level that point towards higher evidence of tolerance and redrafting 
the text instead of an agreement with the direction of the policy. As for the STAGE 
attribute, we considered the most relevant cases to be those showing larger 
information gain in the process, and where the most relevant processes elected 
were those arising from discussions in a progressive stage (value "3") and veto 
(value "4"). Lastly and regarding the CONVERGENCE attribute, its greatest 
relevance would be attested the more it establishes closer ties with the party in 
Presidency or with whoever is occupying a ministerial office so as to better 
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evaluate and verify party connection within Appropriation. Thus, there are no 
doubts that the values "2" and "3" would reflect this scenario. 
Once the calibration stage is concluded, the software maps the 
combinations and stipulates for each of them their consistency level with the 
Appropriation categories. This mapping is accomplished through building a table of 
analysis or "truth table". The "truth table" is the central element of QCA, defining 
the subsets of conditions or analysis attributes. It contains the empirical evidence 
collected by the researcher, classifying cases in the possible combinations, i.e., 
across the lines of the truth table. Each one of these lines is connected to the result 
and is evaluated according to consistency parameters. Ragin (2006) recommends 
that the consistency of each configuration shown in the truth table should be no 
lower than 0.75 and, if no problems are found with a scarce database, the 
frequency for each configuration should not be lower than 3 cases. Once these 
parameters are identified we use Boolean algebra algorithms to identify 
regularities. 
 
Reading of results  
The outputs generated by QCA are demarcated by logical expressions 
describing the combinations of the attributes considered to be sufficient, i.e., those 
that consistently respond positively to the desired result. 
We must first explain that the software generates three alternative sets for 
the results. The first, called Complex Solution, offers a more detailed solution, which 
assumes that all configurations without corresponding empirical cases produced 
the absence of results of interest, preventing the simplification of sufficient 
configurations. The second, called Parsimonius Solution offers a simpler solution 
and assumes that all configurations with no cases directly related to the database 
(counterfactual) produce an outcome of interest, which allows for a maximum 
simplification of sufficient configurations. A third solution, Intermediate Solution, 
includes the solution of some counterfactual configurations that are consistent 
with outcomes of interest.  
In the research I chose not take into account such configurations, given 
there are no problems concerning the "limited diversity", i.e., the low frequency of 
empirical data. In this case, Complex and Intermediate outputs are identical. 
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Once the offered solution is decided upon, we verify the configurations. 
Each configuration is accompanied by an analysis. First we have consistency, 
which indicates the degree of adjustment of the empirical data to the configuration 
of the results, or the percentage of scores generated by the configuration itself with 
a positive correlation with the outcome (in this case, with the category of 
Appropriation). Then we have the coverage or the percentage the outcome 
(category of Appropriation) which had a positive correspondence with the 
configuration. The coverage presents empirically relevant measures for the 
configurations considered to be consistent. 
The first parameter, raw coverage, covers the entire response capability 
with the category of Appropriation. The second parameter, Unique coverage, 
measurers the "liquid" coverage, or the percentage of the result covered 
exclusively by the configuration, which makes sense when there is more than one 
configuration assigned as being a consistent result. Furthermore, the analysis 
provides two further pieces of information: overall solution coverage and overall 
solution consistency, corresponding to the applied results aggregating the set of 
configurations produced within the Boolean logic. As for consistency, the 
recommendation remains in the direction of only adopting levels above 0.75 
(RAGIN, 2006). As for coverage, there is no minimum parameter to be observed. 
Regarding the definition of "centrality" of the attributes found in each 
configuration found, the suggestion by Fiss (2011) is to take the parsimonius and 
intermediate solutions to detect the core and peripheral attributes. Core attributes 
are those that are part of both solutions, while peripheral attributes are those not 
part of a parsimonius solution. 
 
